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Summary: Researchers have proposed that planting false memories could have positive behavioral consequences. The idea of de-
ceptively planting ‘beneﬁcial’ false memories outside of the laboratory raises important ethical questions, but how might the gen-
eral public appraise this moral dilemma? In two studies, participants from the USA and UK read about a ﬁctional ‘false-memory
therapy’ that led people to adopt healthy behaviors. Participants then reported their attitudes toward the acceptability of this ther-
apy, via scale-rating (both studies) and open-text (study 2) responses. The data revealed highly divergent responses to this conten-
tious issue, ranging from abject horror to unqualiﬁed enthusiasm. Moreover, the responses shed light on conditions that
participants believed would make the therapy less or more ethical. Whether or not deceptively planting memories outside the
lab could ever be justiﬁable, these studies add valuable evidence to scientiﬁc and societal debates on neuroethics, whose relevance to mem-
ory science is increasingly acute. Copyright © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Consider an important memory from your childhood, which
inspires you to do great things or to be a better person. Now,
imagine learning that this experience never truly happened
and that in fact, the memory was artiﬁcially planted in your
mind by somebody intent on pushing you to achieve your
potential. How would you react: with outrage, perhaps, or
with gratitude? In recent years, psychological scientists have
recognized that certain false autobiographical memories
could lead to improvements in people’s lives and lifestyles
(Bernstein and Loftus, 2009; Laney and Loftus, 2017). One
implication is that deliberately planting such memories could
in principle serve to beneﬁt individuals and societies. But
would the general public ever view such an intervention as
acceptable? In this paper, we report the ﬁrst systematic ex-
amination of how people weigh the ethics of using deception
to plant ‘beneﬁcial’ false memories, as a means to control
people’s unhealthy behaviors.
Most memory researchers conceive false memories as a
normal by-product of our ﬂexible and reconstructive mem-
ory system, wherein recollections are altered each time they
are retrieved (Newman and Lindsay, 2009; Schacter, 2001).
Because the capacity for distortion is inherent in everyday
memory processes, ‘persuading’ people to change their
memories is far more plausible than most people typically
believe (Nash, Wheeler, and Hope, 2015; Simons and
Chabris, 2011). Indeed, in studies conducted over the past
20 years, researchers have used manipulation and suggestion
to plant distinctive and emotional false childhood experi-
ences into participants’ memories—from taking a balloon
ride, to being attacked by an animal, to committing a crime
(Porter, Yuille, and Lehman, 1999; Shaw and Porter, 2015;
Wade, Garry, Nash, and Harper, 2010). Together, these stud-
ies demonstrate that it is indeed possible to plant vivid and
detailed memories of entire ﬁctional experiences.
Memories play a crucial role in shaping our attitudes, de-
cisions, and behavior (Biondolillo and Pillemer, 2015;
Pezdek and Salim, 2011). Importantly, a wealth of evidence
conﬁrms that this role applies to false beliefs and memories,
as well as to true beliefs and memories. For example, after
developing false beliefs of having their ear uncomfortably
‘licked’ by a rogue Pluto character at Disneyland, partici-
pants in one study were subsequently less willing to pay
for a Pluto souvenir (Berkowitz, Laney, Morris, Garry, and
Loftus, 2008). In other contexts, false memories stand to
have more severe consequences, such as mistaking a termi-
nally ill family member’s dying wishes (Sharman, Garry,
Jacobsen, Loftus, and Ditto, 2008) or identifying an innocent
suspect from a lineup (Garrett, 2011). In recent years,
though, researchers have also explored the possibility that
false memories can have positive behavioral consequences
(Fernández, 2015; Howe, 2011).
The largest research program so far to explore the positive
behavioral consequences of false beliefs and memories fo-
cuses on healthy eating (Bernstein and Loftus, 2009; Laney
and Loftus, 2017). In these ‘food studies’, researchers have
led adult participants to falsely believe in or remember either
a negative childhood experience with food or drink (e.g. got
sick after consuming it) or a positive experience (loved it the
ﬁrst time they tried it). These studies showed that false be-
liefs and memories inﬂuenced participants’ current dietary
preferences. For instance, people who developed false be-
liefs and memories of getting sick from consuming hard-
boiled eggs, dill pickles, strawberry ice cream, vodka or
rum subsequently reported less interest in consuming those
foods or drinks again (Bernstein, Laney, Morris, and Loftus,
2005a, 2005b; Clifaseﬁ, Bernstein, Mantonakis, and Loftus,
2013). Similarly, people who developed false childhood be-
liefs or memories of loving asparagus reported a stronger
preference for that food (Laney, Bowman Fowler, Nelson,
Bernstein & Loftus, 2008; Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wake-
ﬁeld, & Loftus, 2008). Perhaps even more compelling, par-
ticipants who developed false childhood beliefs or memories
of getting sick after eating spoiled peach yogurt actually ate
less peach yogurt in an ostensibly unrelated taste test the fol-
lowing week (Scoboria, Mazzoni, and Jarry, 2008; Scoboria,
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Mazzoni, Jarry, and Bernstein, 2012). These latter studies
demonstrate especially clearly that false beliefs and memo-
ries can inﬂuence behavior.
Suppose then that by using deception to plant false memo-
ries of certain childhood eating experiences, an expert could
lead obese people to change their consumption of unhealthy
foods. After the ﬁrst of the food studies was published, the
media were quick to speculate about this possibility, coining
it the ‘False-Memory Diet’ (Glassie, 2005). One could also
envision many other hypothetical variants: Perhaps false
memories could make people less scared of visiting the den-
tist (Pickrell et al., 2007) or make lazy people love to
exercise. Researchers and practitioners within the ﬁeld of
psychotherapy have even discussed the viability of deliber-
ately planting false memories as a way to resolve and treat
psychological traumas. Indeed, since at least the late 19th
century, there have been anecdotal—and arguably troubling
—claims of therapeutic attempts and successes in this regard
(e.g. Gravitz, 1994; Meyerson, 2010; Scheﬂin, 1997).
But would such deceptive and manipulative interventions
ever be advocated in practice? And, more importantly, should
they? Undoubtedly, the notion raises sizeable moral and eth-
ical questions. There is of course long-standing concern
about the acceptability of certain psychological therapies that
have the potential to evoke false memories (Loftus and
Ketcham, 1994). This concern, however, typically relates to
the idea that a therapist could intentionally or unintentionally
plant false memories of childhood trauma. Few people, we
hope, would seriously entertain the idea that it could ever
be acceptable to plant false memories of child abuse. Perhaps
some people would feel differently, though, about the accept-
ability of planting relatively benign, nontraumatic memories
with the benevolent intention of improving someone’s health
and well-being. These moral and ethical questions—irrespec-
tive of how legitimate memory-planting therapies would ever
be—are important to tackle as neuroethical and
neurophilosophical perspectives assume increasingly crucial
roles in the science of memory modiﬁcation.
The ethics of modifying memories
The ethical dimension of the false-memory therapy scenario
has not escaped researchers’ or media commentators’ atten-
tion. As Bernstein, Pernat, and Loftus (2011) point out, ‘A
few false memories of loving asparagus or getting sick from
strawberry ice cream may or may not outweigh the ethics in-
volved in planting these memories’ (p. 1660). Whereas many
publications contain similarly cautious statements about the
ethics of planting memories outside of the lab (e.g. Clifaseﬁ
et al., 2013; Pezdek & Freyd, 2009), some take less equivo-
cal positions. For instance, Sher (2000) suggested that ‘The
possibility of use of implantation of ‘good’ memories in psy-
chotherapeutic practice should be explored…. [It] should be
used under strict ethical and legal control to prevent possible
abuses’ (pp. 628–629). Opposing this view, Childress (2015)
cautioned ‘However useful the creation of false memories
might be in engendering healthy behavior, it transgresses
important ethical barriers and violates respect for persons,
their dignity, and their autonomy. It would be morally peril-
ous for a democratic society even to contemplate such
manipulations as options’ (pp. 34–35). Notably, these latter
positions demonstrate wildly contrasting perspectives.
Yet, more than a decade after the ﬁrst of the food studies
was published, there have been no formal attempts to explore
people’s attitudes toward the ethics of deceptive false-mem-
ory therapy (hereafter, FMT). In contrast, there is consider-
able research on the ethics of artiﬁcially erasing or weakening
bad memories. Drugs such as propranolol can ‘dampen’ the
emotional content of traumatic memories without erasing
them completely, and this pharmaceutical possibility has trig-
gered rich academic debate surrounding the foreseeable mis-
use or overuse of so-called “cosmetic neurology” (e.g. Henry,
Fishman, and Youngner, 2007; Liao and Sandberg, 2008).
Tenenbaum and Reese (2007), for instance, have argued that
memory manipulation creates a conﬂict between the interests
of society and of individuals. For example, they noted that
people’s memories of terrible experiences can be instrumen-
tal in establishing safeguards that prevent other people from
suffering similar experiences in the future. Indeed, dampen-
ing memories of criminal acts could be considered tanta-
mount to contaminating legal evidence, and legal scholars
have debated whether people might therefore have a moral
duty to remember traumatic events (Kolber, 2006). In one
study, researchers examined people’s attitudes toward
memory-dampening drugs and found that although most
(54%) claimed they would want the choice of receiving such
a drug if they were a victim of a violent crime, relatively few
(18%) would actually take it (Newman, Berkowitz, Nelson,
Garry, and Loftus, 2011). These ﬁndings might lead us to
expect that people would feel no more easy about the notion
of altering memories via FMT.
Public attitudes on planting beneﬁcial memories
So what are people’s attitudes on the ethics of FMT? At pres-
ent, there is no systematic evidence of public views, akin to
those captured by Newman et al. (2011), about this issue.
People’s responses to moral dilemmas often involve a utili-
tarian calculation of the ‘greater good’, opting for whichever
course of action seems to evoke least harm (Baron, 1998;
Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013). A utilitarian might believe,
then, that any health intervention can be ethical if it improves
well-being, perhaps irrespective of how that improvement is
achieved. People might furthermore argue that autobiograph-
ical memory is inherently reconstructive and that inaccurate
memories are therefore entirely ordinary, adaptive, and un-
likely to be harmful (Newman and Lindsay, 2009). In con-
trast, people might forecast that FMT would cause many
kinds of harm. We know, for instance, that people’s autobio-
graphical memories are closely interrelated with their sense
of self and personal identity (Wilson and Ross, 2003). Peo-
ple who consider this interrelationship might worry about
the ethics of leading people to experience their own identities
in ways that are inauthentic (Erler, 2011). Moreover, unlike
memory-dampening drugs, the effectiveness of FMT would
likely hinge on deceiving the ‘patient’—often considered ta-
boo and the epitome of unethical practice in healthcare
(Childress, 2015; Miller, Wendler, and Swartzman, 2005).
We might reasonably expect, then, that many people would
judge FMT as equally taboo.
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The current studies aimed to examine public perceptions
about the ethics and acceptability of a hypothetical FMT, al-
though we should stress that our aim was not to explicitly or
implicitly endorse memory-planting interventions. Partici-
pants from the USA and UK—two countries whose obesity
rates are among the highest in the Western world (www.
who.int)—read a hypothetical scenario involving the decep-
tive use of FMT to alter unhealthy behavior, and reported
their perceptions of the acceptability of this therapy. A utili-
tarian view on the ethics of FMT should hinge on consider-
ations about whether or not FMT would cause more harm
than it prevents (Baron, 1998). Based on this reasoning, we
predicted that people would report more favorable attitudes
toward FMT if they were ﬁrst reminded of the public health
and socioeconomic burden of obesity. To test this prediction,
half of the participants in study 1 read contextual information
and statistics about the burden of obesity, whereas half did
not. Furthermore, given that people tend to have a rosy view
of their personal pasts (Newman and Lindsay, 2009) and
would therefore presumably see negative memories as unde-
sirable, we predicted that people would feel more favorably
toward FMT if it involved planting positive rather than neg-
ative false memories. To test this prediction, half of partici-
pants read about a therapist who plants happy childhood
memories, whereas the other half read about a therapist
who plants unhappy childhood memories. Alongside exam-
ining these two contextual factors, in study 1 we also col-
lected data on participants’ desire to control the events that
occur to them (Burger and Cooper, 1979). We predicted that
FMT would seem particularly unpalatable to people with a
stronger desire for control.
STUDY 1
Method
The protocols for both of the present studies were approved
by the ﬁrst author’s school ethics committee.
Participants
A market research company recruited 922 adult residents of
the USA or UK, who participated online in exchange for
credits that they could use to purchase rewards (e.g. gift
cards). Within each national sample, the company recruited
participants using sex and age quotas to approximate na-
tional demographics. However, 164 participants failed our
attention check (described shortly) and were excluded from
analyses. The remaining 758 participants included 415 peo-
ple who identiﬁed as females, 342 who identiﬁed as males,
and 1 person who speciﬁed neither female nor male sex.
The participants had an overall mean age of 48.7
(SD=16.8, range =18–92; see Table S1 in Supplementary
Materials for further demographic details).
Materials
Vignettes
Depending on participants’ randomly assigned condition,
they received one of four vignettes describing a therapist
who deceptively planted false childhood memories to
improve a person’s healthy-eating behavior (see Supplemen-
tary Materials for the full text). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst manip-
ulated whether participants received information about the
socioeconomic consequences of obesity (context vs. no con-
text given). Participants in the ‘context’ conditions read a
paragraph about the public health and socioeconomic burden
of obesity in the USA and UK. This paragraph included sta-
tistical estimates from peer-reviewed sources of how obesity
affects the incidence of disease, the ﬁnancial costs of treating
obese patients, and future forecasts of these statistics. Partici-
pants in the ‘no context’ conditions did not receive this
paragraph.
In the text that followed, participants in all conditions
were asked to imagine that they were morbidly obese and
sought professional support from a therapist after failing to
control their diet. To help the patient improve their healthy
eating, the therapist recommended a new therapy that in-
volved talking about childhood memories of food. After sev-
eral sessions of this therapy, the participant saw that their
diet improved and began to lose weight. Months after the
therapy ended, though, the therapist got in touch to disclose
that the therapy had used deception: They had used ‘false-
memory therapy’ to deliberately plant false memories with
the intention of changing the participant’s eating habits.
The therapist, they learned, collaborated with the patient’s
family to verify that the suggested events never truly oc-
curred. The memories that the therapist supposedly planted
varied in valence (positive vs. negative) depending on partici-
pants’ randomly assigned condition. Participants in the
‘positive’ conditions were told the therapist had planted false
memories that as a child they loved trying new healthy foods,
such as asparagus and broccoli. In contrast, participants in the
‘negative’ conditions were told the therapist had planted false
memories of having been really sick as a child after eating
unhealthy foods, such as ice cream and donuts.
Desirability of Control
Participants also completed Burger and Cooper’s (1979) De-
sirability of Control Scale, a 20-item measure of people’s
preference for having control over the events that happen
to them. Participants rated themselves on items such as ‘I
try to avoid situations where someone else tells me what to
do’, using a scale from 1 (the statement does not apply to
me at all) to 7 (the statement always applies to me).
Procedure
After giving informed consent and reporting their sex, age,
and ethnicity, participants read one of the four randomly
assigned vignettes at their own pace and without a time limit.
Then, participants responded to several written statements.
First, they considered how acceptable it would be for a thera-
pist to use FMT to improve their own and other people’s eating
habits. Speciﬁcally, using scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree), participants responded to the statements: ‘If
I were obese, I think it would be acceptable for a therapist to
deliberately plant false memories to improve my healthy
eating habits and reduce my obesity’ and ‘I think it would be
acceptable for a therapist to deliberately plant false memories
to improve other obese people’s healthy eating habits and
reduce their obesity’. The order of these two statements was
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counterbalanced, and hereafter, we refer to them as the
‘Acceptable for Me’ and ‘Acceptable for Others’ questions,
respectively. Next, participants were asked about the ethics
and morality of FMT.1 Two statements were presented with
the stem ‘I think that deliberately planting false childhood
memories to improve a person’s healthy eating habits and
reduce their obesity is…’, and participants made ratings ﬁrst
from 1 (completely immoral) to 7 (completely moral) and
then from 1 (completely unethical) to 7 (completely ethical)
[Correction added on 08 October 2016, after ﬁrst online
publication: In the preceding sentence, the Ethical question
rating representations were wrongly swapped and have been
corrected in this version.]. These are hereafter referred to as
the ‘Moral’ and ‘Ethical’ questions, respectively.
On the next page of the survey, we gauged whether
participants thought this therapy could actually work. They
rated two statements, ‘I think that deliberately planting false
childhood memories is…’ (1 = completely impossible;
7 = completely possible) and ‘Assuming that somebody did
develop false childhood memories during this therapy, I
think the chance of them changing their eating habits as a
result is…’ (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very likely).
Next, we included an attention check question to ensure
that participants had actually read the vignette. We asked,
‘In the scenario you read above, what kinds of foods did the
therapist plant false childhood memories about?’ Participants
saw four options in a random order: asparagus and broccoli
(the correct answer in the positive conditions), ice cream
and donuts (the correct answer in the negative conditions),
eggs and pickles, or cookies and cheese. All participants
who chose an incorrect answer were excluded from analyses.
Participants next completed the Desirability of Control
Scale and were asked whether they had ever experienced
concerns about their own weight and/or eating habits (Yes
or No). Finally, participants received debrieﬁng information.
Results and discussion
We ﬁrst wanted to learn whether participants thought it would
be acceptable for a therapist to use a deceptive FMT on them if
they were obese. Recall that all participants rated their agree-
ment that FMT would be Acceptable for Me, from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Participants provided an ave-
rage rating of 3.93 (SD=2.29, Mdn=4), almost exactly at the
scale midpoint. Likewise, when asked about the acceptability
of using the therapy on other obese people (Acceptable for
Others), the mean rating was 3.78 (SD= 2.23, Mdn=4).
Interestingly, the difference between these two means was
signiﬁcant: People felt that FMT would be more acceptable
if used on themselves than if used on others, t(757) = 4.34,
p< .001, d= 0.16, Wilcoxon Z=4.61, p< .001. Participants
were however somewhat less convinced that FMT would be
moral and ethical: Their mean ratings were 3.48 (SD=1.98,
Mdn=4) and 3.47 (SD= 2.04, Mdn=4), respectively.
Although participants’ ratings of acceptability, morality,
and ethicality averaged around the midpoint of the scales,
their attitudes at the individual level were diverse. As
Figure 1 illustrates, the modal response was that FMT would
be entirely unacceptable, immoral and unethical, yet a size-
able minority of participants believed the exact opposite.
Figure 1 also illustrates that people who were unfavorable to-
ward FMT tended to have stronger views compared with
those who were favorable. The following analyses attempt
to identify some sources of systematic variance in these
ratings.
Were people’s attitudes inﬂuenced by the information they
received?
We were primarily interested in the extent to which our ex-
perimental variables inﬂuenced participants’ attitudes toward
FMT. As illustrated in Table 1, a 2 (valence: positive vs.
negative memories planted) × 2 (socioeconomic context:
context vs. no context given) ANOVA on the Acceptable
for Me ratings revealed that to a small but signiﬁcant extent,
planting positive memories was considered more acceptable
than planting negative memories, F(1, 754) = 9.05, p< .01,
η2p = .01, d=0.22. The effect of adding socioeconomic con-
text information was not statistically signiﬁcant, F(1, 754)
= 2.93, p= .09, η2p< .01, d=0.12, nor was the interaction be-
tween valence and socioeconomic context, F(1, 754) = 0.28,
p= .60, η2p< .001. The same pattern of results emerged for
Acceptable for Others ratings, with a signiﬁcant main effect
of valence, F(1, 754) = 8.44, p< .01, η2p = .01, d=0.21, no
signiﬁcant main effect of socioeconomic context, F(1, 754)
= 1.16, p= .28, η2p< .01, d=0.08, and no signiﬁcant interac-
tion, F(1, 754) = 0.29, p= .59, η2p< .001.
Looking to participants’ ratings of the morality and ethics
of FMT, our analyses revealed the same results as for accept-
ability. In both cases, there were main effects of valence
[Moral F(1, 754) = 9.35, p< .01, η2p = .01, d=0.22; Ethical
F(1, 754) = 8.03, p< .01, η2p = .01, d=0.21], but no main ef-
fects of socioeconomic context [Moral F(1, 754) = 0.56,
p= .45, η2p< .001, d=0.06; Ethical F(1, 754) = 0.24, p= .62,
η2p< .001, d=0.03] and no interactions [Moral F(1, 754)
= 0.34, p= .56, η2p< .001; Ethical F(1, 754) = 0.38, p= .54,
η2p< .001]. For all four attitude ratings (i.e. Acceptable for
Me, Acceptable for Others, Moral, Ethical), nonparametric
Mann–Whitney tests conﬁrmed the signiﬁcant main effect
of valence (in all cases, Z>2.88, p< .01) and nonsigniﬁcant
effect of socioeconomic context (in all cases, Z<1.70,
p> .08). We also obtained the same pattern and signiﬁcance
of results, including the nonsigniﬁcant interaction effects,
when we dichotomized each dependent variable into low
(1–4) and high ratings (5–7) and conducted loglinear analy-
ses. In short, these data suggest that attitudes toward FMT
depend to a small extent on the type of memory that is
planted but were not reliably changed when we emphasized
the socioeconomic burden of obesity.
Who is most and least favorable to false memory therapy?
To explore whether participants’ attitudes toward FMT dif-
fered systematically according to their demographic charac-
teristics, we averaged Acceptable for Me, Acceptable for
Others, Moral, and Ethical responses to form a composite
1 Many academics treat ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’ as interchangeable terms, but
others argue that there are important distinctions between the two. We asked
our participants whether FMT would be both moral and ethical because we
believed that some participants may see the term ‘ethical’ as aligning specif-
ically with professional codes of practice and ‘moral’ as aligning with more
absolute ideals of right and wrong.
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‘favorability’ scale (α= .97). In terms of nationality, UK par-
ticipants were more favorable toward FMT (M=3.94,
SD= 1.98) than were those from the USA (M=3.37,
SD= 2.05), t(756) = 3.86, p< .001, d=0.28, Mann–Whitney
Z=3.86, p< .001. Likewise, males were more favorable
(M= 3.96, SD= 2.01) than females (M=3.43, SD= 2.03), t
(755) = 3.61, p< .001, d=0.26, Mann–Whitney Z=3.53,
p< .001. There was also a weak, but statistically signiﬁcant,
negative correlation between age and favorability, such that
younger participants were more favorable than older partici-
pants, rspearman =.09, p= .01. Attitudes toward FMT, it
would seem, may differ quite systematically across different
demographics, although it is important to note that all of
these effects are small.
We also conducted two further exploratory analyses. One
prediction we made was that participants who reported
greater desirability of control would be less favorable to
FMT. In fact, participants’ favorability scores were not
signiﬁcantly related to their Desirability of Control scores,
rspearman = .07, p= .07. Moreover, favorability scores did not
differ signiﬁcantly between those participants who had expe-
rienced concerns about their weight and/or eating habits
(n=541; M=3.60, SD= 2.06) and those who had not
(n=217; M=3.82, SD=1.98), t(756) = 1.35, p= .18,
d=0.11, Mann–Whitney Z=1.23, p= .22.
Beliefs about the potential effectiveness of false memory
therapy
Finally, we examined whether participants believed FMT
could actually work. Overall, participants believed that it is
somewhat possible to plant false childhood memories
(M= 4.82, SD=1.62, Mdn=5) but were less sure whether
these memories would change people’s eating behaviors
(M= 4.02, SD=1.59, Mdn=4). People’s overall favorability
ratings were positively correlated with their belief that it is
possible to plant false childhood memories, rspearman = .13,
Figure 1. Distributions of ratings for the Acceptable for Me, Acceptable for Others, Moral, and Ethical questions, by participants in the positive
memories condition (black bars) and negative memories condition (grey bars). For ‘Acceptable for me’ and ‘Acceptable for others’ questions,
1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. For ‘Moral’ question, 1 = completely immoral; 7 = completely moral. For ‘Ethical’ question,
1 = completely unethical; 7 = completely ethical [Correction added on 08 October 2016, after ﬁrst online publication: In Figure 1 caption, the
rating representations for “Acceptable for me” and “Acceptable for others” were wrongly swapped and have been corrected in this version.].
Table 1. Mean attitude ratings toward false-memory therapy as a function of valence and socioeconomic context
Condition
Negative memories Positive memories
No context Context No context Context
Acceptable for Me 3.58 (2.31) 3.77 (2.35) 3.99 (2.27) 4.36 (2.16)
Acceptable for Others 3.50 (2.26) 3.59 (2.30) 3.89 (2.21) 4.15 (2.11)
Moral 3.25 (2.03) 3.27 (2.04) 3.60 (1.98) 3.79 (1.83)
Ethical 3.27 (2.13) 3.26 (2.13) 3.60 (2.04) 3.77 (1.83)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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p< .001, and with their belief that false memories would
change people’s behavior, rspearman = .43, p< .001. In other
words, those people who were more inclined to believe that
FMT could work were also more likely to ﬁnd it acceptable,
moral and ethical, although again, we emphasize that this as-
sociation was weak.
STUDY 2
The results of study 1 give insights into the variability of public
attitudes toward deceptively planting beneﬁcial false memo-
ries, but tell us little about people’s reasoning. Why did some
participants rate FMT as moral whereas others found it deeply
immoral? To address this question, in study 2, we asked new
participants to explain their attitudes toward FMT, and to
consider any circumstances that might make FMT seem less
or more acceptable, moral and ethical. We then coded the par-
ticular reasons that participants gave into different categories.
Our categorization process was inductive and not guided by
any a priori theory or coding scheme. However, in our descrip-
tion of the reasons given for and against FMT, we brieﬂy relate
each category to the four core principles outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists
(UDEPP), which underpin professional psychologists’ ethical
decision-making. These are as follows:
1 Respect for the dignity of persons and peoples. This prin-
ciple emphasizes the inherent worth of individuals irre-
spective of their social, racial, or individual identities
and characteristics. It also includes considerations of
people’s right to provide free and informed consent, to
privacy, and to fair and equal treatment.
2 Competent caring for the well-being of persons and peo-
ples. This principle emphasizes the importance of provid-
ing beneﬁts to people and of either doing no harm or
minimizing harm—often referred to as the ideals of benef-
icence and nonmaleﬁcence, respectively.
3 Integrity, which emphasizes the fundamental goal of com-
municating honestly and openly, and also the importance
of identifying and mitigating potential biases, prejudices
and conﬂicts of interest.
4 Professional and scientiﬁc responsibilities to society, which
involves considering how to improve scientiﬁc knowledge
and understanding, and how to use this understanding re-
sponsibly and ethically to broadly serve the well-being of so-
ciety (International Union of Psychological Science, 2008).
Method
Participants
A market research company recruited 240 participants who
took part online in exchange for credits that they could use
to purchase rewards. Exactly half were residents of the
USA, and half were residents of the UK. Recruitment took
place according to quotas to approximate national demo-
graphics for age and sex (see Table S2 in Supplementary
Materials for demographic details of the sample). Our overall
sample included 124 people who identiﬁed as females and
116 who identiﬁed as males. The participants had a mean
age of 46.5 (SD=17.2, range = 18–84).
Materials and procedure
All participants consented to take part and provided their de-
mographic details before reading one of two vignettes. Both
vignettes began with a general description of the rationale for
the hypothetical FMT. Participants were asked to imagine
that in the future, FMT exists and can be used to improve
various health behaviors. Next, the vignettes contained the
identical obesity scenarios as in the no-context conditions
of study 1, and we again experimentally manipulated
whether the therapist planted positive or negative false mem-
ories in the ﬁctional patient.
After reading one of the two randomly assigned vignettes,
all participants typed open-text responses to four questions.
First, they were asked whether it would be acceptable, moral
and ethical to deliberately plant false childhood memories to
improve a person’s health-related behavior. They were then
asked to describe any factors they might take into account
when making this judgment, whereby they might think ‘It
would be unethical, unless…,’ or ‘It sounds acceptable, but
not if….’ On the next page, the other two questions pressed
participants for their thoughts on whether two speciﬁc cir-
cumstances would make FMT less or more acceptable, moral
and ethical: (1) if the therapist never disclosed the deception
to the patient after their therapy ended and (b) if somebody
other than a therapist—such as a parent or a teacher—planted
false memories to change a person’s health-related behavior.
After typing responses to these four questions, participants
answered the ‘Moral’ and ‘Ethical’ scale-rating questions
from study 1, but with the stems re-worded to ‘I think
deliberately planting false childhood memories to make
people behave in more healthy ways is…’ (1 = completely
immoral/unethical; 7 = completely moral/ethical).
Data coding
Two researchers (R1 and R2) independently examined the re-
sponses to the ﬁrst two open-text questions, blind to
participants’ experimental condition and demographic details.
Through discussion, R1 and R2 then used a content analytic
approach to identify and iteratively reﬁne broad ‘themes’ of
reasons why the therapy was considered unacceptable or
acceptable (listed shortly and in Tables 2 and 3). Next, R1
coded each participant’s responses into as many of these
themes as appropriate. In parallel, R1 and R2 used the same
process to generate a second list of themes, signifying circum-
stances that participants said would affect the ethics of FMT
(listed in Table 4). Again, R1 coded each participant’s re-
sponses into as many of these themes as appropriate. For each
of the latter two open-text questions—about the ethics of fail-
ing to debrief the patient and of the use of FMT by nonprofes-
sionals—R1 simply coded each response into one of three a
priori categories: either (1) this scenario is generally less ac-
ceptable; (2) this scenario is generally more acceptable; or
(3) this scenario is no different in acceptability, or the response
was ambivalent or ambiguous. To assess inter-rater reliability,
a research assistant independently coded 20% of responses,
blind to R1’s judgments. We report reliability statistics in the
respective sub-sections of the text. Because reliability was
good across all categories, all analyses are based on R1’s
coding.
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Table 2. Reasons why participants believed that false memory therapy would be unacceptable
Reason category
Proportion of
responses Illustrative quotes
Consequences 37% “I think planting false memories is a dangerous practice. Perhaps the false
memories of the patient in the previous example would give them some new sort
of trauma.”
“Memories that we can recall of real events that happened to us are what makes us
individuals, if you take that away and implant false memories that person will lose
sight of who they really are.”
“I think I would feel manipulated and would lose my trust in the therapist. It is a
situation where the client may feel they are baring their soul to a therapist and as
such I would want to feel complete trust in the therapist.”
The ends do not justify the means 32% “This method is not different than lying to someone and [then] excusing it [by]
explaining why you lied. This does not undo the breach of trust that can go much
further than the issue immediately at hand.”
“I feel rather uneasy at the idea of people accessing my mind and tinkering with my
memory.”
Potential for abuse 14% “Far too dangerous. The ﬁrst application I can see would be to persuade gay people
they "ought" to be heterosexual. How long before the ruling party used it to "cure"
people who voted for the opposition?”
“This kind of ’treatment’ could be very dangerous e.g. the person [might] have
memories implanted suggesting that he enjoys eating cabbage every day instead
of fast food, followed by a memory telling him that he had already decided that
once he reached a certain weight he was going to Syria to join the IS or is going
to stand in Trafalgar Square and cut his own throat.”
Lack of consent 10% “This method distorts the concept of informed consent by putting the cart before the
horse. Being informed after the fact doesn’t ethically serve the purpose of protecting
people’s interests.”
Practical doubts 8% “It’s not likely childhood memories would stop someone from eating something if
they have plenty of adult memories which tell them the opposite anyway.”
“Surely there would be a very high risk of once the deception is exposed that the
person may well regress in terms of their eating behaviour.”
Better alternatives 7% “A better way to address this would be to try to get to the psychological root causes
and reframe the way the person sees food, and change their habits via this method/
approach instead.”
Free will 3% “People have the choice on whether they eat a healthy diet or unhealthy food that
make them obese, by changing a person’s memories you are actually taking that
choice away from them as they will act on memories and feelings. We do not have
the right to change people in any way shape or form, we cannot act as gods and
make those sorts of decisions.”
Table 3. Reasons why participants believed that false-memory therapy would be acceptable
Reason category
Proportion of
responses Illustrative quotes
The ends justify the
means
36% “Yes I think this would be great. If it helps with your health surely that’s the most important thing. [Too]
many people worry about things that aren’t as important as your health.”
“If we are going to talk about morals then in my opinion someone who is abusing their body by being
obese due to overeating or having alcoholism due to an addiction then it shouldn’t really matter if a
small trick has been used to help them improve themselves.”
Increasing treatment
options
6% “I think, generally, people should be allowed to do what they want with [themselves] provided they don’t
harm others and that we should seek to maximize their ability to make choices, with few restrictions,
even if those choices might be an illusion.”
Some people need
support
6% “Many obese people will tell you that they need as much help as they can get as the reason they are in
that position is because they have gotten out of control. Like drug abuse we don’t expect these people to
help themselves most of the time we put them in rehab. These people need something more powerful
[than] their addiction something that triggers their [subconscious] to curb their cravings. Therefore I
would believe this procedure to be deemed as acceptable.”
“Sure it would be ethical, I know someone very close to me that is up to 540 lbs and will soon be a
diabetic, nothing is getting through to her, she will shorten her life, if this type of therapy would
work, I would be all for it, it would save her life. We love her and want what’s best for her.”
No harm would be
done
5% “I don’t think it is wrong at all and very acceptable. What harm can this do?”
“I think that it is acceptable to plant false memories. Memories are very subjective, and people
remember things differently than how they actually happened already.”
No worse than
alternatives
5% “Many medical treatments involve taking drugs or having surgical operations. These involve putting real
things into the body. Sometimes they do not turn out beneﬁcial and may even result in more harm than
good. So, just putting false thoughts into someone’s thoughts does not seem nearly as invasive or
potentially harmful.”
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Results and discussion
Our analysis revealed seven key reasons why people
tended to ﬁnd FMT unacceptable, and ﬁve key reasons
why people tended to ﬁnd FMT acceptable. Tables 2 and
3 provide illustrative quotes for each of these key argu-
ments against and for FMT, respectively, and some addi-
tional quotes are included in the main text. In total, 93%
of participants’ responses ﬁt at least one category; the
remainder were too unclear or nonspeciﬁc to classify.
Inter-rater agreement ranged from 81 to 98% across these
12 categories (Gwet’s AC1 from .64 to .98).
Reasons why FMT is unacceptable
Consequences
As Table 2 shows, the most common overall arguments
against FMT, seen in 37% of responses, involved concerns
about the consequences or dangers of planting false memo-
ries. In other words, the goal of nonmaleﬁcence (i.e. mini-
mizing or avoiding harm) was a fundamental guide for
these people’s reasoning, as reﬂected in the UDEPP core
principle of ‘competent caring’. Many participants feared un-
speciﬁed side effects that might plausibly arise from FMT,
but others had more speciﬁc concerns, as follows and as
illustrated in Table 2.
Psychological consequences. Some people argued that
planting false memories could harm the patient’s psycho-
logical well-being, either because they believed merely
having a false memory could in itself cause psychological
harm, or because they believed there may be psychological
effects of discovering that a childhood memory was false:
People may not cope with the end result if they have so
many good memories to then ﬁnd out [they’re] not true,
we are a nation of stress eaters so [therefore] it may turn
people very depressed.
Authenticity. Some participants shared a concern about the
effect that false memories would have on the authenticity
of patients’ lives. Several pointed out that memories are intri-
cately tied up with personality and identity in this sense, and
argued that being grounded in reality is a critical component
of any successful therapy.
Social consequences. Other participants feared social reper-
cussions of planting false memories, particularly how those
memories—or discovering the deception—might affect the
patient’s relationships with the therapist or with family
members:
The individual might begin to blame their parents for
allowing them to overeat as a child, and causing the adult-
hood obesity.
The ends do not justify the means
The second largest principal argument against FMT (32%)
was that the integrity of therapeutic methods is more impor-
tant than any potential beneﬁts. In the context of professional
ethical principles, these people implied that even if FMT
could meet the goal of beneﬁcence (i.e. providing beneﬁts),
Table 4. Circumstances that participants believed would inﬂuence the acceptability of false-memory therapy.
Reason category Proportion of responses Illustrative quotes
Gaining informed consent 23% “If the person is OK with having false memories implanted, then it’s ﬁne. But they
should get the choice to do so, and not have it done without their knowledge”
“To make it acceptable: informed consent of the patient, or a contract that covers more
than one possible practice so false memories are a possibility but not a foregone
conclusion (this is probably impossible, which is partly why I don’t think it could/
should be done)”
Professional oversight 16% “Subject to a proper ethical and moral code of practice being put in place I think this
would be a perfectly acceptable and excellent way of tackling obesity and other
[health] problems and phobias.”
“Psychologists and/or therapists should have to go through rigorous testing before
being taught this technique and allowed to use it.”
Patient factors 14% “I believe false memory therapy is only unethical if the patient is not suffering from a
life threatening condition […] if it was used because someone was slightly
overweight for example and just wanted to look better i.e. no direct threat to their
health, then it would be unethical. It’s relative to the situation of the patient.”
Contextual factors 12% “There are lots of things that go wrong in a person’s life, some things that make it hard
to go on. Like my sister [passed] away, as unbearable as that was for me and my family,
especially my mom. I don’t think it’d be right to rewrite something like that in someone’s
life. As painful as it is, she is my sister, I wouldn’t want my memories changed of her.”
Evidence 9% “It’s acceptable [… if] it is found that actually long-term false memories are very very
unlikely to cause any harm.”
“If you can still do things you normally do daily without any mental or physical side
effects, then I see no factors that would make this unacceptable.”
Debrieﬁng 3% “I don’t believe that it is immoral or unethical in any way provided the person being
treated understands at the end that they are going to get long term beneﬁt from the
treatment.”
“I believe as long as the person is informed that [it] was false afterwards and is shown
what good it has done then [there] is no harm done.”
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as mirrored in UDEPP’s principle of ‘competent caring’,
achieving this goal would nevertheless be outweighed by se-
rious concerns over the principle of ‘integrity’. Many partic-
ipants made general comments to this effect, some of whom
speciﬁcally pointed to the perceived immorality of lying to
people in healthcare contexts or indeed in general:
It would not be acceptable because it would be lying to
the person. Tell them the truth. I don’t really know what
else my thoughts are except that it would be lying, and ly-
ing is wrong.
Participants in this category also frequently alluded to a gen-
eral sense of distaste with ‘tampering’ with people’s minds:
I think it would be very unethical and immoral to do any-
thing close to this. Our minds should not be modiﬁed in
this way.
Potential for abuse
The next most common reason given against FMT—
expressed by 14% of participants—was a concern that it
could ultimately be used for purposes more nefarious than
improving public health. These responses emphasize again
the core ethical principle of ‘integrity’, under which the
UDEPP speciﬁes ‘not exploiting persons or peoples for per-
sonal, professional, or ﬁnancial gain’ (International Union of
Psychological Science, 2008). But they are also well cap-
tured by the principle of ‘Professional and Scientiﬁc Respon-
sibilities to Society’, under which UDEPP includes ‘the
discipline’s responsibility to use psychological knowledge
for beneﬁcial purposes and to protect such knowledge from
being misused’ (International Union of Psychological Sci-
ence, 2008). Our participants envisaged several examples
of possible nefarious uses of FMT, for example:
If you could convince me I ate certain things and got sick
you could convince me I killed someone.
Lack of consent
In the ethical domains of ‘respect’ and ‘integrity’, some par-
ticipants unsurprisingly mentioned the lack of informed con-
sent as a reason why FMT is unacceptable (10%). It may
seem more surprising that as few as 10% of people were
classiﬁed into this category; however, note that many other
people suggested that gaining consent could make the ther-
apy more ethical. These kind of ‘less or more ethical’ re-
sponses were coded separately in the ‘circumstances’
analysis, described shortly.
Practical doubts
Some participants expressed doubts about whether FMT
could actually work (8%), which of course would present a
substantial concern in the ethical domain of ‘competent
caring’. In very few cases, these doubts regarded the actual
plausibility of planting false childhood memories, but in
more cases, they concerned the likelihood that false memo-
ries would lead people to change their behavior or about
the longevity of this behavior change after the deception
were revealed.
Better alternatives
A small minority of people (7%) felt that FMT would be un-
acceptable partly because they believed that other less-
questionable methods would be equally or more effective
for improving healthy behavior. These concerns would once
again align with the UDEPP principle of ‘competent caring’.
Free will
Finally, 3% of participants had concerns about the extent to
which planting false memories would rob patients of the free
will to control their own behavior. These participants’ con-
cerns seem to relate to the considerations of human dignity
encompassed within the core ethical principle of ‘respect’.
But they also once again relate to ‘competent caring’, insofar
as that principle concerns ‘respect for the ability of individ-
uals, families, groups, and communities to make decisions
for themselves and to care for themselves and each other’
(International Union of Psychological Science, 2008).
Reasons why FMT is acceptable
The ends justify the means
Among those participants who expressed at least partly fa-
vorable attitudes toward FMT, the majority suggested that
the ends do justify the means (36% of the total sample). That
is to say, like many of the people described in the preceding
sections, these people recognized a tension between the prin-
ciples of ‘integrity’ and the beneﬁcence aspects of ‘compe-
tent caring’. However, unlike those described in the
preceding sections, these people saw beneﬁcence as being
the primary index of ethical practice, rather than integrity.
Some in this category argued simply that helping people
and potentially saving lives should always be the foremost
concern, whereas others explicitly considered the potential
risks but determined that these were outweighed by the po-
tential beneﬁts.
Increasing treatment options
Focusing on another aspect of ‘competent caring’, partici-
pants sometimes argued (6%) that FMT would increase the
diversity of healthcare options available and that it should
be up to individuals or their families to determine which op-
tions to pursue.
Some people need support
Similarly, some participants (6%) argued that people are not al-
ways able to control their own behavior and therefore often
need external support to do so. These concerns once again res-
onate with the principle of ‘competent caring’, but may also be
interpreted in terms of the principle of ‘respect’ insofar as it
concerns ‘fairness and justice in the treatment of persons and
peoples’ (International Union of Psychological Science,
2008). Interestingly, among the participants in this category
were some who explicitly claimed that they would wish to
receive FMT, either for someone they knew or for themselves:
As someone who has struggled with her weight all her life,
I wouldn’t be upset at all to have someone help me in this
manner. I would think that some people would resent it; al-
though I can’t imagine why, if the therapy worked.
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No harm would be done
Considerations about nonmaleﬁcence (under ‘competent
caring’) were relevant to some of the arguments in favor of
FMT, not just those against. Speciﬁcally, a minority of par-
ticipants (5%) felt that planting false memories could simply
do no harm, or that because memory is naturally reconstruc-
tive anyway, having false memories is normal.
No worse than alternatives
Finally, 5% of participants argued that FMT would be
similar to, no worse than, or even better than alternative
interventions that already exist. Relative appraisals of
nonmaleﬁcence and beneﬁcence, encompassed in ‘compe-
tent caring’, were therefore the apparent drivers behind these
participants’ reasoning.
In sum, diverse arguments underpinned participants’ be-
liefs for and against using FMT.Whereas many of these argu-
ments highlighted differences of opinion over whether or not
the ends can truly justify the means, others shed light on peo-
ple’s beliefs about memory and their valuing of authentic rec-
ollection. We found little evidence that our valence manipu-
lation (positive vs. negative memories) inﬂuenced the types
of arguments people gave. In fact, comparing how frequently
the seven ‘against’ and the ﬁve ‘for’ reason categories were
used across conditions, there was just one signiﬁcant differ-
ence even without correcting for multiple comparisons.
Speciﬁcally, participants in the negative condition seemed
somewhat more likely to use a ‘better alternatives’ line of
argument against FMT (10%), compared with those in the
positive condition (4%), χ2 = 4.35, p= .04, φ= .14. For all
other comparisons, χ2<2.55, p> .11, φ< .11.
Circumstances that would inﬂuence the acceptability of
FMT
Whether or not people found the idea of FMT appealing,
their views might be contingent on factors not accounted
for in the vignettes. Our data revealed six types of consider-
ation that people said would affect the ethics of FMT; these
are summarized in Table 4 alongside illustrative quotes. In
total, 54% of participants described at least one of these con-
siderations; Inter-rater agreement ranged from 75 to 96%
across the categories (Gwet’s AC1 from .65 to .93).
Gaining informed consent
The most commonly mentioned circumstance was gaining
consent: 23% of participants felt that the therapy could be
(more) acceptable if it was possible to gain informed consent
from patients or their families. Some of these, of course,
were the same people who also speciﬁed the lack of consent
as a reason why FMT was unethical in the form it was de-
scribed. Interestingly, several participants suggested ways
of gaining partial consent without completely disclosing
the methods, which they believed could make the therapy
more acceptable:
It’s acceptable [… if] a person consents to ‘deceptive’ or
‘risky’ treatments, even if they don’t know precisely what
they are.
Professional oversight
For some participants (16%), the acceptability of FMT
would depend on the extent and quality of the professional
standards in place for monitoring and regulating this therapy,
and on the therapist’s motives.
Patient factors
A subset of participants (14%) felt that the therapy would be
more acceptable for some patients than others, especially in-
sofar as the severity of their health problem was concerned.
Among these participants, some said that FMT would only
be acceptable if all other options had been exhausted:
Other treatments should be attempted ﬁrst, obviously, but
if all of them fail, and there is a real danger for [irrevers-
ible] damage, then this method of treatment should be
attempted. I suppose I would look at it as a sort of last re-
sort tactic.
Contextual factors
Although our valencemanipulation did not systematically alter
participants’ arguments, participants did occasionally indicate
that the acceptability of FMT would depend on what kinds
of memories were implanted and for what purpose (12%):
Don’t soil a third party’s reputation or implant memories
that could be potentially traumatic, such as false memo-
ries of abuse from a friend or family member.
It would not be acceptable under any normal circum-
stances unless requested by the subject although as a
way of [rehabilitating] a criminal […] it may be
considered.
Evidence
A small group of people (9%) said that they would take into
account what was known about the effectiveness and side ef-
fects of the therapy.
Debrieﬁng
Finally, only 3% of participants spontaneously said that the
acceptability of the therapy would depend on the nature of
the debrieﬁng.
Together, these six circumstances tell us that although par-
ticipants often had strong views on the idea of FMT, not all
of these views were unequivocal, and in fact, a majority felt
that planting false memories outside of the lab could be less
or more acceptable under certain conditions.
Would it be less or more acceptable if…?
Next, we examined whether participants felt it would make a
difference if the patient were never debriefed, or if false
memories were planted by nonprofessionals such as a parent
or teacher. The analysis showed that 23% believed failing to
debrief the patient would make the therapy less acceptable,
whereas 7% felt that it would make the therapy more accept-
able (inter-rater agreement = 88%, Gwet’s AC1= .83; see
Table 5 for illustrative quotes). In total, 28% said that it
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would be less acceptable for nonprofessionals to plant false
memories, whereas 4% said that this could be more accept-
able than the therapeutic scenario (inter-rater agree-
ment = 83%, Gwet’s AC1= .76).
Scale-rating data
Finally, we analyzed participants’ scale ratings, averaging
their ratings of the morality and ethicality of FMT to form a
favorability index (α= .97). Looking at these scores, there
was no signiﬁcant main effect of valence (positive
M= 3.52, SD= 2.04; negative M=3.20, SD=1.95), t(238)
=1.26, p= .21, d=0.16, Mann–Whitney Z=1.25, p= .21.
However, our UK sample was again signiﬁcantly more favor-
able toward FMT (M= 3.67, SD= 1.84) than was the US
sample (M= 3.09, SD= 2.12), albeit this was once again a
small effect, t(238) = 2.28, p= .02, d=0.29, Mann–Whitney
Z=2.54, p= .01. The main effect of participant sex was not
signiﬁcant (females, M= 3.29, SD=1.98; males, M=3.47,
SD=2.03), t(238) =0.71, p= .48, d=0.09, Mann–Whitney
Z=0.68, p= .50, and nor was the correlation between favor-
ability and participant age, rspearman =.10, p= .14.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Using deception to plant ‘beneﬁcial’ false memories outside
of the laboratory could in principle have many conceivable
applications. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that
forms of this intervention have been used in certain niche
(and perhaps troubling) psychotherapies for many decades
(Gravitz, 1994; Scheﬂin, 1997). Yet, the idea raises serious
ethical dilemmas. As the evidence mounts showing that false
memories can promote positive behavior change, the present
studies are the ﬁrst to explore public attitudes on this conten-
tious issue.
Both studies highlight a wide range of reactions to the no-
tion of a hypothetical false-memory therapy. In the majority
were people who found the idea of FMT horriﬁc, sinister and
an affront to individuals’ freedom to control their own lives.
These participants described quite diverse lines of reasoning,
drawing upon the UDEPP ethical principles of respect for
people’s dignity, of competent caring for people’s well-
being, and of integrity. These people often foresaw diverse
unwanted side-effects of planting memories, and imagined
that sanctioning false memory treatments would begin a slip-
pery slope toward serious abuses of power and of people. In
contrast, a substantial minority of participants were highly
enthused about this ﬁctional therapy, and even believed that
it would be more attractive than existing health or medical
interventions. These participants tended to base their reason-
ing mostly on considerations about competent caring for
people’s well-being, speciﬁcally in terms of providing benef-
icence. That is to say, they often took a utilitarian approach
and felt that the potential harm presented by this intervention
would be minimal compared with the beneﬁts it might de-
liver. It is interesting to note the relative absence of argu-
ments, for or against FMT, which emphasized the fourth
UDEPP principle, namely professional and scientiﬁc respon-
sibilities to society. Our participants tended to focus their
ethical reasoning at the level of the individuals who might
hypothetically receive FMT, rather than at the societal level;
this result may shed some light on why our context manipu-
lation in study 1 had no discernible effects on participants’
judgments.
Among those participants who felt strongly against the
idea of FMT, most had important practical concerns, citing,
for example, individuals’ inability to give consent, and the
inappropriateness of using deception in healthcare contexts.
These concerns were likely fundamental in setting our partic-
ipants’ consensus generally against the acceptability of
FMT. Much laboratory research on false memories involves
deceiving participants to some extent, and it seems reason-
able to assume that the use of deception would likewise be
a crucial component of any viable FMT. However, the
Table 5. Illustrative quotes from participants regarding alternative forms of the ‘false-memory therapy’ scenario
Makes it less acceptable Makes it more acceptable
Failing to debrief the patient “It would make it less ethical. Because you would
in essence be, to a degree, rewriting that person’s
very history. Their life. The original method is
still morally ambiguous, however at least it
attempts to undo some of the potential harm with
honesty a bit later on. This method does not have
that feature.”
“This makes it more unethical. Your memories
would need to be a lie for the rest of your life.
Memories are far too important to our self-
identity.”
“I think if a therapist has made false memories for
a patient then they should not be taken away once
the patient is better, this would be unethical and
not fair on the person who has been given false
memories in the ﬁrst place. This could undo all
the work done in the ﬁrst place.”
“I think that it would be far better and much more
kinder to the patient to allow them to continue
believing everything they had previously been
told.”
Planting of ‘beneﬁcial’ false
memories by nonprofessionals
“Less acceptable because it’s being presented as a
kind of medical treatment and these people
wouldn’t have medical degrees, held to oaths,
and wouldn’t have those degrees or accreditation
taken away if they arbitrarily practiced it.
Additionally, parents and teachers are deﬁnitely
going to abuse it, there’s just no question.”
“No I think this should only be done by a
professional. Teachers and parents aren’t skilled
enough for mind control.”
“If a parent were to plant these memories you
wouldn’t necessarily look at them as unethical as
you are trying to improve your [child’s] health.
Parents frequently tell little white lies to children
to get them to ﬁnish food or ﬁnish homework.
You are not placing your trust in a professional
by having your parents do this.”
“I feel it would be more acceptable if it were a
parent as I would have absolute trust in a
parent’s actions being completely for my beneﬁt
with only my good as their justiﬁcation.”
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accuracy of this assumption is an open question, especially
when we consider the results from randomized medical trials
in which patients saw health improvements despite being
truthfully informed that they were only receiving an inert
placebo (see Kaptchuk et al., 2010, for a striking example).
It would therefore be interesting to know the extent to which
the consensus on FMT might shift if the hypothetical patient
gave full informed consent and no deception were employed.
It is unlikely, though, that all of people’s concerns about
the ethics of FMT would be resolved by avoiding decep-
tion. Many of our participants’ additional concerns—partic-
ularly those regarding the possibility that false memories
themselves could have negative consequences—offer
broader insight into people’s understanding of memory
distortion. In particular, these responses illustrate the value
that people place upon authentic recollection, that is,
remembering in ways that are ‘true to ourselves’ and that
afford control over our own identities (Erler, 2011). In this
respect, our ﬁndings are compatible with those of Newman
et al. (2011), in showing that people typically resist the
notion of tampering with memories, even when doing so
could serve to beneﬁt the individual. However, like in New-
man et al.’s study, the present data also suggest that people
do not always place memory authenticity above all other
considerations. Indeed, although the majority consensus in
both present studies fell against the use of FMT, both
datasets also highlight circumstances under which partici-
pants felt planting memories could be (more) acceptable.
For instance, in study 1, people were rather more comfort-
able with planting positive memories compared with nega-
tive memories. This small effect was consistent but not
signiﬁcant in study 2. That study did reveal, though, that
many people’s attitudes toward FMT depended on consider-
ations such as the type of memory planted, the severity of
the patient’s health issues, and the safeguards in place to
protect patients from harm.
It is worth emphasizing that the participants in these stud-
ies considered a hypothetical scenario for which they likely
had no preconceived beliefs or attitudes. Naturally then, the
difﬁculty of affective forecasting is relevant here (Wilson
and Gilbert, 2003), and it is impossible to know whether peo-
ple’s stated beliefs would be similar if FMT were a real and
viable treatment option for a friend or relative. Nevertheless,
these data serve as a snapshot of people’s instincts on the ac-
ceptability of deceptive memory manipulation. Views on the
ethics of memory enhancement typically evolve over time;
indeed, even the use of mnemonics and written memory aids
has been considered immoral within some societies at partic-
ular points in history (Madan, 2014). As public awareness of
memory’s reconstructive properties increases, it is interesting
to consider whether views toward FMT might similarly
change over time. In study 1, the people who found the idea
of FMT most acceptable tended to be those who believed
strongly (in line with the scientiﬁc literature) that planting
false childhood memories is possible. This ﬁnding might lead
us to speculate not only that attitudes on neuroethical di-
lemmas such as these could be more liberal among cognitive
scientists than among the general public, but also that public
attitudes could become more liberal as public understanding
of memory functioning grows. This prediction is bolstered
by our ﬁnding that younger participants—who typically have
more accurate beliefs about memory than do older genera-
tions (e.g. Simons and Chabris, 2011)—were somewhat more
in favor of FMT. Whether a shift in attitudes over time would
be desirable is, of course, a matter of opinion, yet the possibil-
ity further underscores the importance and timeliness of
mapping this contentious ethical terrain.
The present studies supplement the literature on
neuroethics and, we hope, will stimulate broader ethical, le-
gal, psychological and philosophical discussions concerning
the implications of beneﬁcial false memories. Despite en-
countering diverse viewpoints in these studies, on the whole,
there does not appear to be a strong appetite for health-
boosting false-memory therapies. Even if, in principle, plant-
ing false memories could reduce people’s yearning for fatty
or sugary foods, doing so would nevertheless leave a sour
taste in the mouths of many.
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